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Abstract 
Rapid urbanization in many African cities has had a significant impact on the basic water 
services in peri-urban areas, where providing services can be complex.  In the city of Maputo, 
Mozambique, the initial uptake of new household connections following network construction 
in peri-urban areas was slow. Focus group discussions with residents and interviews with key 
actors revealed the importance of offering flexible payment options to the urban poor in order 
to increase the affordability of connection charges. Although the high connection fee was a 
constraint, residents were willing to pay if the charges were spread across several monthly 
instalments. These findings suggest that flexible payment arrangements for customers can 
both bring utility services within reach of low income households and expand the customer 
base for utility service providers. 
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1 Introduction 
The world is rapidly urbanizing. Since 2008, the share of the global population living in urban 
areas has been higher than that in rural ones (UNHabitat 2010). This trend drives a new 
urgency in the dynamics of providing access to improved water sources because the challenges 
faced in urban context differ substantially from those in rural conditions. One of the main 
obstacles to serve safe water in the world’s bulging cities is the difficult access to distribution 
networks in the slums. The challenges that the peri-urban areas of many African cities face in 
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regard to water service is not only of technical nature but also social and financial. Water 
utilities are often formally charged with providing 100% water supply coverage but they find 
enormous constraints when reaching the slums. Geographical conditions, low ability to pay 
and the lack of strong local political structures are some of the challenges that water providers 
often face in the slums. 
Many low-and-medium-income countries have been unable to match investments in urban 
infrastructures with rapid urban growth (Keener et al. 2010). This mismatch has led to a slow 
down and in some cases a complete halt in the expansion of service delivery to informal 
settlement areas. The consequence is that a great number of residents from unplanned 
settlements lack access to basic services such as water supply (Gulyani et al. 2010). Aware of 
this situation, development agencies have recognised the need to support many cities in their 
efforts to upgrade urban slum areas, and some programs such as The Cities Alliance have been 
launched by the World Bank and UN-Habitat focusing on slum upgrading (Goether 2001). 
The primary reason for the slow expansion of urban infrastructure into peri-urban slums is the 
high cost of network extension which has forced many governments to be selective about 
which areas receive networked services (Ferguson et al. 2003). Local authorities have only 
been able to afford to expand service delivery to a very small number of urban slum areas, 
resulting in a limited proportion of the population being served. In this context the process of 
scaling up service interventions has become a strategic approach for many development 
agencies in order to ensure appreciable impacts. Related literature reports that a second 
common reason for failure to undertake service expansion to peri-urban slum areas lies in a 
lack of political will (Davis 2004). Whilst funding and political ambition are recognised as being 
of paramount importance in facilitating network expansion, they are not the only bottlenecks. 
Even when political commitment is guaranteed or when funds are sufficient to meet demands, 
there are other factors that need to be approached carefully. In particular, attention has been 
drawn to the need for community priorities to be incorporated into water supply plans 
through collaboration with utility providers (Allen et al. 2006). Such collaborative approaches 
can be achieved by developing mechanisms which promote social organisational capacity. In 
this context, the capacity of the utility in to elicit, understand, and incorporate social needs 
into its service plans is crucial (Pinera et al. 2009). An appropriate leadership function able to 
coordinate multiple contributions is also seen as crucial for achieving practical action and 
NGOs have been suggested as appropriate providers of this function due to their legitimised 
relationships with stakeholders (Pinera et al. 2009). Finally, slum dwellers’ own organisations 
(formal or informal) constitute a representational and often highly democratic body whose 
engagement has been found to be important in delivering effective water provision schemes 
(Burra 2005). 
Many of the reported studies in this field are based strongly on scheme implementation 
experiences and they suggest that users´ priorities (Gulyani et al. 2007) and a better 
understanding of the services they are willing to contribute towards (Raje et al. 2002) need to 
play a significant role. It is something of a truism that the challenges faced by residents in 
deprived areas vary considerably from suburb to suburb and that there is no single response 
appropriate to all cases (Pinera et al. 2009), but calls for interventions to be adapted to 
particular local conditions (Gulyani et al. 2010) are genuinely challenging to implement. The 
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level of heterogeneity even within a single neighbourhood can be extensive (Gessler et al. 
2008) with significant variation in income, housing condition, culture, and capacity to take 
advantage of service provision (Gulyani et al. 2010). 
On the supply side of the equation the challenges are no less daunting. Despite the enormous 
social and economic benefits of providing improved water to the poor, delivering these 
benefits place significant pressures on utilities (Banerjee et al. 2010). Water providers have to 
find a balance between the investment required for network expansion and service 
affordability. Complementing an iterative expansion strategy with carefully targeted subsidies 
and evolving regulation has been suggested as a way forward (Fernandez-Maldonado 2008) 
that has a move towards cost reflective tariffs for conventional customers while offering 
creative options to the poor in order to facilitate services to all (Gerlach et al. 2010).  Without 
such pro-poor policies and sensitive regulatory structures to facilitate them, the urban poor 
are likely to have to pay very high prices for small quantities of water of uncertain quality from 
alternative suppliers (Gerlach et al. 2010). There is something of a vicious circle here in that 
whilst urban water utilities fail to serve low income households because of the high cost 
involved in extending services to low income settlements, low ability to pay for the 
connections and low ability to pay the volumetric water rates (Kayaga et al. 2007), such 
households cannot benefit from cross subsidies in the tariff structure since they are not 
connected to the piped water supply (Kayaga et al. 2003) . Moreover, households  that have no 
water piped to their home often have some members spending one or two hours each day 
getting water, queuing and filling  water containers (UN-Habitat 2003) . This represents an 
extra burden because the time spent in these tasks cannot be employed in income generating 
activities.  
Water providers typically only move to supply unplanned peri urban areas with water services 
when they are obliged to by contractual commitments. However, even supplying trunk mains 
through slum neighbourhoods often falls short of service requirements as households are 
often unable to effect a connection (Kayaga et al. 2007) . Payment is again the issue here as 
connection costs are usually unaffordable and residents with irregular incomes struggle to pay 
lump-sum accumulative amounts through regular payments (Malizani 2008) . Although there 
has been much debate about issues such as affordability, willingness to pay and tariff 
structures in low income areas, most of these discussions have focused on the volumetric 
consumption charges rather than connection charges (Kayaga et al. 2007) . Flexible payment 
options remain an area of challenge for utilities (Kooy et al. 2008)  as do innovative tariff 
structures and minimum consumption charges which often represent a burden for the poorest 
customers (Banerjee et al. 2010). 
 
One such city where water services do not extend to all of the poorest citizens is Maputo, the 
capital of Mozambique.   The city is characterized by a developed central area surrounded by 
densely populated and informally laid out shantytown areas inhabited by the poor. These 
densely populated areas have been formed around the city centre because that is where the 
work opportunities arise and where street vendors can find customers. The households are 
relatively well established, most with block built houses but generally lacking legal property 
rights. Further out from the city centre the density of population decreases, with some of 
these outlying areas formally laid out and others less so. Areas which are formally laid out are 
more likely to be catered for by local service providers without external help. The water supply 
to the central area and surrounding shantytown areas have was let as concession to a private 
water company operator called Aguas de Mozambique (AdeM) until 2010. From 2011, though, 
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the water utility in charge of serving such population is Aguas da Regiao de Maputo (AdaRM). 
Both inside and outside this concession area water is also supplied from boreholes operated by 
SSIPs (Small Scale Independent Providers).    Other stakeholders include the Maputo 
Municipality and FIPAG, the asset holding body for water resources in large cities in 
Mozambique. 
 
In terms of employment it is estimated that around 60 per cent of the Maputo workforce is 
engaged in the informal sector where predominant activities are commercial and service 
provision, with a relative lack of small scale producers of goods (Jenkins 2000).  
 
For administrative purposes the city is divided into units called Bairros, which, at the same 
time, are subdivided into Quarters. These bairros also host Community Based Organisations 
(CBOs) that focus on social issues and help residents to coordinate efforts. An example of such 
CBO is the case of OPTAR, which was founded in 2001 after the disastrous effects of the floods 
that year, and which has been responding to the bairro´s demands ever since. OPTAR has been 
introduced into the project to act as interlink between the implementers and the community 
since they can deal with local structures and local residents from within. 
 
Table 1 shows the Poverty Headcount Index within several bairros of Maputo. It represents the 
proportion of the population living below the poverty line, defined as the monetary value of 
the basic consumption needs considered to be adequate to reach a certain minimum living 
standard (Ravallion et al. 2005; Van den Boom 2011). It shows that poverty is not evenly 
distributed.   Maputo Municipality and FIPAG decided to target tertiary network extension  
into some of the poorest bairros in Maputo, starting from Maxaquene A and B, which are 
among the poorest   This was supported by the not-for-profit company Water and Sanitation 
for the Urban poor (WSUP).   These bairros are in the densely populated and informally laid 
out areas. 
The network extension allowed the majority of households in Maxaquene A and B to 
undertake private connections in an easy way as the distance to the main water pipe was 
shortened.  However, table 2 shows that only 25% of the households of Maxaquene A and 11% 
of Maxaquene B purchased household connections, the remainder opting to buy water from 
neighbours or water kiosks with a small proportion still purchasing water from other private 
networks.   Small scale individual providers have been operating in underserved districts of 
Maputo since early 80s but were widely spread in the last decade (Matsinhe et al. 2008) . A 
detailed analysis undertaken in greater Maputo in 2006 concluded that more people 
depended on standpipes and water resold than on private household connection (Keener et al. 
2010) (see table 4).  
This research aims to explain why the take up of household connections was so low. 
 
2 Methodology 
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This research is based upon an inductive research strategy where data collection is a 
combination of interviews, focus group discussions and direct observation carried out during 
the months from July to September 2010 plus documentary analysis based on reports 
published from 2008 to 2011.   The research activities are summarised in table 3. 
The aim of the focus group discussions was to understand the motivations and barriers to 
obtaining a household water connection.    Participants were selected by purposive non 
random sampling in order to gather information from specific groups: female with household 
water connections, female without connection, male with and without connections, CBO 
members and community representatives, so in total there were five focus groups of ten 
members each in each bairros.  The results were recorded regarding the decisions accepted by 
the majority of the group. The focus group discussions were conducted at community public 
premises. 
The interview data was supplemented by information from key informants on their 
understanding as to why the take up of household connections had been so low.   Key 
informants included one local representative from each of the following organisations in each 
bairros, so ten interviews in total:  
 WSUP 
 OPTAR 
 AdeM 
 Bairros administration  
 Quarter administration  
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way with closed- and open-ended 
questions. Each respondent was informed about the confidentially, consent and anonymity of 
provided data according to the authorization from the Cranfield University Science and 
Engineering Research Ethics Committee.  
The data was analysed using comparative and thematic content techniques (Robson 2002). In 
doing so, opinions and ideas from all the respondents have been organised according to 
relevant categories. The selection of each category responded to the main themes proposed in 
related literature to explain uptake of household connections, these included the cost of 
connection (Collignon et al. 2000; Kayaga et al. 2007), the service reliability (Matsinhe et al. 
2008), the alternative sources (Keener et al. 2010), the water quality (Gulyani et al. 2010) , the 
flexibility offered (Allen et al. 2006), the communication process (Gerlach et al. 2010), and the 
participatory system (Kooy et al. 2008; Fernandez-Maldonado 2008) among others. Once the 
arguments were organised, the criteria to establish priorities has emerged from the emphasis 
that informants attributed to each category. 
3 Results and discussion 
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3.1 Flexible payment options 
 
It is often challenging for water utilities in Africa to balance the efforts of providing safe and 
affordable water to consumers while ensuring institutional and commercial sustainability of 
the water system (Banerjee et al. 2010). Many providers fail to serve the urban poor because 
of the high costs involved in extending services to slum areas due to low ability of slum 
dwellers to pay for volumetric water rates and connections (Kayaga et al. 2007). In the suburbs 
of Maxaquene A and Maxaquene B these limitations were only a small part of the problem, in 
fact the members of nine out of ten focus groups from the study confirmed that they were 
willing to pay for both volumetric water rates and connection charges. Moreover all of the 
focus groups identified household connections’ volumetric rates as cheaper than those 
charged by informal providers. This is backed up by the following figures: the official tariff has 
been established by The Water Regulatory Council (Conselho de Regulaçao do Abastecimento 
de Agua, CRA) at 22 MT/m3  (0.59 $/m3 ) (1 US dollar = 37 Meticais for August 2010) whereas 
the key informants calculated that average tariff for alternative supplies runs from 50 – 60 
MT/m3 (1.35 – 1.62 $/m3 ) for standpipe supplies to 75 – 80 MT/m3 ( 2.02 – 2.16 $/m3) for 
neighbour resell. Kayaga and Franceys (2007) found that volumetric consumption charges have 
often been an obstacle for new users to join the network. In Maxaquene A and Maxaquene B 
volumetric consumption tariffs are not a significant factor influencing the low number of 
private connections undertaken following construction of the network, instead the costs of 
connecting to the water scheme had an impact. This cost covered the meter installation and 
the cost of material. As it has been recognised by Banerjee and Foster (2010) connection 
charges have often been a considerable barrier to consumers, but unlike the tariffs they have 
not received sufficient attention yet. Private connections are often inaccessible to low income 
residents because the costs of connecting tend to be so high that they are unaffordable for 
slum dwellers (Malizani 2008). In peri-urban Maputo the connection charge had been 
established by the water utility in 4400 MT ($119), which is relatively high comparing with the 
broad spectrum of connection charges across Africa where it ranges from $6 in Sudan to $ 240 
in Niger (Banerjee et al. 2010). Members of nine out of ten focus groups remarked that despite 
their willingness to pay the connection charge of 4400 MT ($119) they had low ability to do it 
in the form that it was offered as 4 monthly instalments of 1100 MT ($29.75) each.  This 
explains why only 1437 connections had been undertaken in both suburbs following 
construction of the tertiary network despite the high number of households (3309) who 
submitted applications to demonstrate they  were  interested in joining the scheme (see table 
4). 
Most low income earners in these areas do not work in salaried positions thus they are obliged 
to manage their money in a day-to-day basis in irregular terms (Collignon et al. 2000). For the 
others, those residents who receive a regular salary, normally from the government, key 
informants have calculated that on average the wages amount between 2250 MT ($60.81) and 
3000 MT per month ($81.08). Normally all the family members pool their income together in 
order to collectively afford household  expenses such as rent, services, school, food and 
medicines. Slum household are unable to build up any reasonable level of capital to invest in a 
lump-sum payment normally demanded as connection charge (Kayaga et al. 2007). For this 
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reason eight out of ten focus groups highlighted the need to be offered a more flexible 
payment option. The most accepted proposal by the population consisted of splitting the total 
charges into 10 monthly instalments of 440 MT ($11.89) each, which seemed an affordable 
amount for members of seven out of ten focus groups This proposal is closely related to the 
recommendations by (Ndokosho et al. 2007) about the need to offer affordable connection 
fees in order to expand services to new customers.  It is also necessary for water providers to 
learn from mobile phone operators who have been able to segment their customer base and 
to differentiate their service to cater for all types of customers (Kayaga and Franceys 2007). 
Water utilities need to allow greater flexibility in order to increase the attractiveness of the 
project to communities (Davis 2004). In Maxaquene A and Maxaquene B it is understandable 
why so many people expressed interest in the scheme by submitting applications but in the 
end were not able to connect because the instalments represented half their month income. 
Negotiations between the utility and the community had already been successful in slums in 
other countries, for example in the city of Buenos Aires where a high connection charge was 
reduced with payment of that amount amortised over several years which resulted on the 
increase of take-up of network private connections(Kayaga et al. 2007). 
Residents in peri-urban Maputo who were not served by the main operator found access to 
water from formal and informal sources, in the form of public and private kiosks and in the 
form of water sold on by neighbours.    However, residents were dissatisfied with this service 
and 9 out of 10 focus groups expressed their preference for private household connections, 
once the obstacle of the connection fee could be overtaken. The reasons they gave to support 
their preference included the volumetric rate, distance, water quality, service reliability and 
regulation. 
Nine focus groups indicated that they prefer a private connection rather than fetching water 
from a standpipe or buying from the neighbours since utility rates are lower in volumetric 
terms.  For example, the prices in 2006 were estimated by The World Bank at 11.3 MT/m3   
for utility connections, 16.6 for public kiosks,  22.3 for private kiosk and 20.6 for neighbour tap 
water resell (Keener et al. 2010). Focus groups confirmed that in some cases vendors even 
charged them twice the price of the fee from a private connection. Often household water 
resellers charge at a cost that covers the volume sold, their own consumption and gives them 
an extra little income. The one focus group who said they didn’t want a private connection 
cited a fear of going into debt as their reason.    
Seven out of ten groups said that the distance they have to walk to collect water is a major 
issue since some kiosks are more than 1km away from their homes which force them to spend 
long time fetching water. This represents a constraint for potential income generating 
activities. While access to water is inexpensive and easy for those with private connections, it 
becomes a demanding task when water collection requires time, physical energy and 
opportunity costs (Aiga et al. 2002). 
None of the male groups but three out of five female groups also valued service reliability and 
that is why they prefer household connections. These respondents believe that kiosks are 
more likely to fail in their service while household connections are more reliable. In these 
bairros, the responsibility of ensuring that households are provided with enough water has 
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traditionally rested on women´s shoulders. Thus, female groups are more concerned  about 
water service reliability than men are.  If the source where they fetch water fails, it is the 
women who commit to bringing water from another source no matter how far it is. 
 
Six out of ten focus groups have remarked that water quality is also an important issue when 
selecting a source. For them higher quality water tastes better, so water from private 
connections tastessuperior to that from private kiosks which exploit groundwater boreholes 
and tastes more saline. All five female groups emphasized the importance of water quality 
while only one out of the male groups paid attention to this factor. Again it is the women who 
are in charge of finding alternative sources where the water quality is acceptable to the 
household members, so they consider this factor more important. 
Regarding regulation three out of ten groups claim that they do not prefer water resold from 
their neighbours because it is illegal. This informal service has experienced an unplanned 
growth, where households with connections have responded to their neighbours’ requests to 
sell water in small quantities. The problem is that this practice is unregulated thus consumers 
have to buy water early in the morning, around 5.00 am, to avoid being penalised by 
controlling authorities. There is a popular call to make this practice authorized and regulated.  
 
3.2 Engagement of the Provider 
 
A slow rate of expansion of services often occurs as the result of a mismatch between the 
bundle of services offered by the utilities and the priorities of slum households (Davis 2004). If 
water managers do not effectively take into account the needs of poor residents, disincentives 
arise for the utility to connect poor household and for poor households to connect the 
network (Kooy et al. 2008). Utilities need to gain a deeper understanding of the customer’s 
needs and the factors influencing customer satisfaction and loyalty. This can be achieved by 
enhancing the information flow between utilities and key stakeholders.   In Maxaquene A and 
Maxaquene B nine out of ten focus groups reported that there was a deficient communication 
between the utility and the community. 
Effective service delivery to poor neighbourhoods can require the skills of social 
intermediation professionals who can facilitate communication between households and 
service providers (Davis 2004). Important steps in this process include transparent 
partnerships (Mara et al. 2008) and community mobilisation through the formation of 
Community Based Organisations CBOs (DelwarAkbar et al. 2007). In peri-urban Maputo the 
communication between the provider and the population experienced a tremendous 
improvement since Optar and Kutenga, the community based organisations in Maxaquene A 
and Maxaquene B, started participating in the program. The water utility did not have initially 
enough resources to communicate thoroughly with the community in the slums and thus the 
two CBOs were contracted to undertake such task. The results were very satisfactory to the 
beneficiaries since the CBOs were introduced because their role emerged a critical need of the 
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community that had not been addressed yet. Optar and Kutenga worked full time every day 
within the population providing information, attending to demands and responding to queries. 
As a consequence a bond of trust naturally aroused which allowed the community to receive 
information in an accessible way and to communicate its needs freely. All focus groups 
confirmed that Optar and Kutenga were responsible for effective communication in 
Maxaquene A and B and, what is even more important, that population trusted them. Both 
CBOs focused on implementing community marketing programmes with the aim of helping 
housholders to connect. They drew attention to the community’s demands and collaborated 
with the community to meet those demands by organizing group meetings or even visits door-
to-door and by transferring information to local district authorities and water utility 
representatives. As a result the community felt more confident to express its needs and was 
also motivated to invest in services that satisfied its demands. 
The role of the CBO was also crucial to promote participation in decision making. 8 out of 10 
focus groups were not satisfied in the past with the level of community participation in 
decision making and were willing to negotiate with the utility new mechanisms to incorporate 
more community members’ opinions in the process. For this purpose the work of CBO was 
necessary to seek a major involvement of the community through meetings, round tables and 
even door to door campaigns. As Khan and Gerrard (2006) point out, the communication 
process needs to begin long before project planning starts and continue throughout the life of 
the project in order to maximise trust between water organisations and stakeholders. 
Moreover, stakeholder participation must be ensured through proper effective communication 
and not just information dissemination (Marimbe et al. 2003). CBO members fit adequately 
into these tasks because communication entails a dialogue and exchange of ideas and 
viewpoints that CBOs have been long encouraging and because CBO members have been able 
to build such trust working with the community day after day. 
Key informants from both the water utility and WSUP highlighted the need to focus on on-
going capacity building in order to optimize the resources and expertise that CBOs can 
contribute to the community. Eight out of ten focus groups reported that more sensitization 
about the water services offered and how to connect to them whereas six out of ten focus 
groups considered that even more CBO members were needed in order to improve 
communication. Considering that over time communities alter, people move into and area or 
leave it and that many variables within a slum may be subject to change, then communication 
process has to be embraced as an on-going activity emerging from within the community 
(Khan et al. 2006).  
3.3 Outcome of changes to network extension programme 
 
Since the focus groups and interviews took place, the fee for a private household connection 
to the water network was reduced up to $70, and what is even more important, the payment 
of this charge was split into 14 instalments, 30% of the charge immediately after connection 
and then, 13 monthly instalments for the remaining amount (Mugabe et al. 2011). This 
resulted in  increasing the uptake of household connections and in just eight months, by 
August 2011, the number of families served by private connections was estimated as 2732 ( 
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80%) in Maxaquene A and 2101 (40%) in Maxaquene B (see table 4).   This confirms the 
findings of this research, that reducing the connection fee and spreading the payments further 
meant that more households could get a connection. 
 
However, it is important to consider the need to support vulnerable groups who have no 
means to afford a connection charge no matter the size of monthly instalments. Key 
informants from WSUP who have perceived the inequality in access to private water 
connections resulting from the billing system recommend setting up programs of targeted 
subsidies from external donors for those destitute groups living under the threshold of 
extreme poverty, defined as a severe deprivation of basic human needs and quantified by the 
World Bank as an average daily income of $1.25 or less.  Such subsidies should cover part of 
the connection charge. 
 At the time the data collection for this research was undertaken in 2010 the service provider 
AdeM was involved in active negotiations with the water regulatory council CRA in order to 
find an effective solution for the controversial issue of water resale to neighbours. This 
practice was common among residents of  low income districts despite being illegal under the 
local regulatory framework. By the end of 2011, after fruitful negotiations, the water utility 
AdaRM and CRA were able to offer contract modalities that allow groups of families to club 
together for a single connection (Mugabe et al. 2011).  This represents a new model of 
supplying water to underserved poor residents of Maputo in accordance with the new 
paradigm of water supply described by Mara and Alabaster (2008) which promotes water 
supply in urban areas to groups of households instead of individual households in order to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals.  
The current water utility AdaRM  has reinforced the link with the community through the 
creation since late 2011 of a permanent team from their staff to develop community 
marketing initiatives in Maxaquene A and Maxaquene B, and to continue the job carried out by 
the CBOs throughout the program in these suburbs. In parallel with the new payment 
mechanisms recently established, this has contributed significantly to the successful increase 
of the uptake of household connections. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
An attempt to scale up a sustainable water scheme to 120,000 residents of peri-urban areas in 
the city of Maputo through household connections has been assessed. Factors influencing the 
uptake of water connections in two suburbs of Maputo will inform the plans to extend the 
scheme to neighbouring areas. 
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In Maxaquene A and Maxaquene B, the two studied bairros, the access of low income 
households to private connections had been lower than expected, despite a targeted 
intervention to increase household connections.    The connection costs were not actually too 
high, however charges could be more affordable for the urban poor in these suburbs if the 
water utility offered flexible payment options.  The study shows that all informants agreed on 
the need to establish new payment mechanisms to allow connection charges to be spread 
across a longer period. In parallel, the relationship between the service provider and the urban 
poor in peri-urban areas of Maputo needed some improvement.   This engagement of the 
water supplier with the residents is key to achieving sustainability of the intervention because 
it is addressing the real needs of the households. In this way, the demands of the residents are 
understood more carefully and therefore the beneficiaries trust the proposed intervention. 
The engagement of the water provider is best achieved through collaboration with community 
based organisations which acted as the link between the utility and the residents,  
Without de-emphasizing the need to improve alternative water sources for the most 
vulnerable urban poor, there are two key factors outstanding as the lessons learnt in this 
study. The uptake of household water connections in peri-urban areas of Maputo has been 
increased by offering flexible payment options to allow spreading the charges into a large 
number of monthly affordable instalments and by engaging the water provider with the 
residents through collaboration with community based organizations.    These approaches are 
promising not only for Maputo but also other low-income countries struggling to improve 
services to the urban poor.    Whilst the latter really needs to be the initiative of the utility 
itself, the former could be instigated by a regulator keen to improve water access by the 
poorest. 
The interface between utility business models and the payment mechanisms which finance 
investment is an important area of innovation for infrastructure based utility services. The 
adage that ‘there is more than one way to skin a cat’ is highly relevant here as methods of 
billing and paying for services which are well established in one context are unlikely to be 
acceptable (or even feasible) in another. This challenge is unlikely to become redundant any 
time soon as the socio-economic reality for both existing and potential utility customers across 
the globe becomes more heterogeneous over time. The ability to match payment mechanisms 
to socio-economic circumstances and the ability to pay may well define what a successful 
utility looks like over the coming years and in this way our findings have wider resonance for 
utility policy. With levels of customer debt on a seemingly unstoppable rise, utilities in 
countries with well established infrastructure based services will need to take note of 
customers’ desire for greater choice in how they pay. This might involve flexibility around the 
timing and proportioning of payments as well as greater levels of service differentiation. The 
challenge for utilities is to learn to cope with the enhanced uncertainty and risk that can 
emerge from more flexible payment regimes. 
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